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LECTURE
Preserving the System: The
Role of Judges*
By ANTHONY LEwIs**
Nine years ago the Hastings Law Journal devoted an issue to the
decisions of Justice Tobriner.1 Not just the work but the man shines
through those pages. One sees a judge who was contemporary in his
awareness of change as the norm in our society, old-fashioned in his rec-
titude and strength of character. Those who knew the justice well wrote
of his sense of history, his concern for human values, his philosophical
perspective, his wisdom.2
To speak in Justice Tobriner's memory at this time is a challenge.
For the values he represented are under attack. The very process to
which he was so devoted, the judicial process, is nowadays called into
question. To say that is to say that there is a threat to one of the founda-
tions of American freedom, or so I believe. It is important for all of us to
try to understand what is happening. For that we need Justice Tobriner's
philosophical perspective, his sense of history.
Let me begin by quoting another judge about the feeling of being
embattled:
[T]hese days no one can complain if any institution, system, or be-
lief is called on to justify its continuance in life. Of course we
[judges] are not excepted and have not escaped. Doubts are ex-
pressed that go to our very being .... I get letters, not always
anonymous, intimating that we are corrupt. Well... I admit that
it makes my heart ache. It is very painful, when one spends all the
energies of one's soul in trying to do good work, with no thought
* This lecture was delivered as the Fourth Annual Mathew 0. Tobriner Memorial
Lecture at the University of California, Hastings College of the Law, on October 20, 1986.
The Tobriner Memorial Lecture commemorates the life work and social vision of Mathew 0.
Tobriner, former justice of the California Supreme Court.
** Columnist, New York Times; Lecturer on Law, Harvard Law School.
1. 29 HASTINGS L.J. 1 (1977).
2. See, e.g., Grodin, Justice Tobriner: Portrait of the Judge As An Artist, 29 HASTINGS
L.J. 7 (1977).
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but that of solving a problem according to the rules by which one is
3bound, to know that many see sinister motives ....
That was said to the Harvard Law School Association of New York
on February 15, 1913, by Mr. Justice Holmes. Attacks on judges are not
new. I did leave out one phrase of Holmes' that would probably have
identified his words as from another age. "[W]e are told," he said, "that
we are representatives of a class- a tool of the money power."' 4 That is
not the complaint today. It is, rather, that judges, or some of them, are
too ready to challenge power. The critics do not speak in exactly those
terms, but I think that is what they mean.
As I hardly need to say here,5 state as well as federal judges are
under attack. But I am more familiar with the federal scene. There the
attack on judges is coming from the highest levels of government. The
President of the United States lately told a political audience: "The
proliferation of drugs has been a part of a crime epidemic that can be
traced to, among other things, liberal judges who are unwilling to get
tough with the criminal element in this society. We don't need a bunch
of sociology majors on the bench."6 The Attorney General of the United
States has lectured judges on the correct mode of constitutional interpre-
tation.7 One of his principal assistants recently excoriated a Justice of
the United States Supreme Court, describing his judicial philosophy as a,
and perhaps the, chief present danger to our liberty.8
Whatever pains Justice Holmes and his colleagues had to bear, such
comments from the top of the executive branch were not among them.
William Howard Taft-a Republican conservative who revered the
Supreme Court and later became Chief Justice-was President when
Holmes made that speech in 1913. His Attorney General was George W.
Wickersham, another respecter of judges. Some things have changed
3. 0. W. HOLMES, Law and the Court, in THE OCCASIONAL SPEECHES OF JUSTICE OLI-
VER WENDELL HOLMES 169 (Howe ed. 1962).
4. Id.
5. At the time of this talk, six of the seven California Supreme Court justices were up for
"reconfirmation." There was a vigorous and controversial campaign led by California Gover-
nor George Deukmejian to deny the confirmation of justices appointed by former Governor
Edmund G. Brown, Jr.-particulary aimed at Chief Justice Rose E. Bird. See, e.g., Friend,
Rose Bird's Being Run Out of Office, AM. LAW., Sept. 1986, at 35. In the event, California
voters denied confirmation to all three of the targeted justices: Chief Justice Bird, Justice Jo-
seph Grodin, and Justice Cruz Reynoso.
6. N.Y. Times, Oct. 9, 1986, at 14, col. 1.
7. Meese, Address to the Meeting of the American Bar Association (July 9, 1985) (text
available from the A.B.A., Chicago) [hereinafter Meese Address]. See also L.A. Daily J., July
10, 1985, at 1, col. 2.
8. Reynolds, Speech to the University of Missouri School of Law (Sept. 12, 1986) (text
available from the Department of Justice). See also N.Y. Times, Sept. 13, 1986, at 1, col. 6.
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since 1913, and one of them is the definition of conservative in American
politics. Many of those who call themselves conservatives today look at
judges and see, in Holmes' phrase, sinister motives.
Attorney General Meese seemed to call into question the good faith
of every Supreme Court Justice for the previous sixty years when he
spoke to the American Bar Association in July, 1985.' He attacked the
long-established view that some of the guarantees of freedom in the Bill
of Rights, the first ten amendments to the Constitution, which originally
protected those rights only against their abridgment by the federal gov-
ernment, now apply also to the states. That is, state like federal officials
are forbidden to suppress freedom of speech,' ° to carry out unreasonable
searches,1 to impose cruel and unusual punishments, 2 and so on.
What the Supreme Court has held is that essential protections of
freedom in the Bill of Rights are embraced in the "due process of law"
guaranteed by the Fourteenth Amendment against deprivation by the
states. 3 I spoke of that view as established because as long ago as 1925
the Court held that freedom of speech was protected against repressive
state action. 4 In 1931 it applied the Press Clause of the First Amend-
ment to keep Minnesota from suppressing a newspaper. 15 In the
Gideon 16 case in 1963 it said the states were bound by the Sixth Amend-
ment's right to counsel guarantee and must provide lawyers for poor de-
fendants in criminal trials.
The history is so familiar that I apologize for running through it
even briefly. But Mr. Meese's 1985 speech showed again the wisdom of
Justice Holmes' remark that "we need education in the obvious."' 7 The
Attorney General was criticizing recent Supreme Court decisions on the
question of religious establishment. 8 The cases all dealt with state and
9. See Meese Address, supra note 7.
10. See, e.g., Gitlow v. New York, 268 U.S. 652 (1925).
11. See, e.g., Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643 (1961).
12. See, e.g., Louisiana ex rel. Francis v. Resweber, 329 U.S. 459 (1947) (assuming, with-
out expressly stating, that the Fourteenth Amendment incorporates eighth amendment
protections).
13. See Palko v. Connecticut, 302 U.S. 319, 324-25 (1937) ("the specific pledges of partic-
ular amendments have been found to be implicit in the concept of ordered liberty, and thus,
through the Fourteenth Amendment, become valid as against the states."); Twining v. New
Jersey, 211 U.S. 78, 99 (1908) ("it is possible that some of the personal rights safeguarded by
the first eight Amendments against National action may also be safeguarded against state ac-
tion, because a denial of them would be a denial of due process of law.").
14. Gitlow v. New York, 268 U.S. 652 (1925).
15. Near v. Minnesota, 283 U.S. 697 (1931).
16. Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335 (1963).
17. 0. W. HOLMES, supra note 3, at 169.
18. Meese Address, supra note 7, at 11.
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local practices. But, Mr. Meese said, the First Amendment's provision
against an establishment of religion "was designed to prohibit Congress
from establishing a national church."' 9 Indeed, he said, the whole Bill of
Rights had nothing to do with state action. The constitutional theory by
which its provisions were applied to the states through the Fourteenth
Amendment was "intellectually shaky."' 20  And then he said:
"[N]owhere else has the principle of federalism been dealt so politically
violent and constitutionally suspect a blow ....
Now of course it is proper for an Attorney General or anyone else to
criticize Supreme Court decisions. The Justices themselves have divided
often and sharply about whether and how to apply particular provisions
of the Bill of Rights to the states.22 But Mr. Meese seemed to be doing
something more: shaking fundamental assumptions about the constitu-
tional rules under which we live. For all of us operate on the understand-
ing that there are limits to what state and local authorities may do:
limits set by the Constitution of the United States and enforced by
judges. In fact, most of the Supreme Court cases that test the extent of
our rights come from state proceedings, whether they concern religion,
or capital punishment, or free speech, or whatever.
If Mr. Meese was serious, there would be nothing to decide in any of
those cases, for there would be no guarantees in the Federal Constitution
to help us. The State of California, for example, could make the Unifica-
tion Church its official religion, and require public employees-teachers,
members of the legislature, police officers-to belong to that church, all
without offending the Constitution of the United States. Minnesota
could put newspapers out of business if they published stories linking
officials to criminal ventures. New York could make all defendants in
criminal cases take the stand and testify against themselves.
That is what "the principle of federalism" requires, in the Attorney
General's view. Or so we must assume, since he said the contrary view-
that the Constitution does protect us against such state repression-had
dealt a "politically violent and constitutionally suspect"2 blow to feder-
alism, to the proper relationship between the state and federal
governments.
Mr. Meese's talk of federalism drew a rare direct response from a
member of the Supreme Court. Justice John Paul Stevens said Mr.
19. Id. at 14.
20. Id. at 13.
21. Id. at 14.
22. See generally J. NOWAK, R. ROTUNDA & J. YOUNG, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 315-18
(3d ed. 1986).
23. Meese Address, supra note 7, at 14.
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Meese had overlooked "the profound importance of the Civil War and
the post-war amendments on the structure of our government, and par-
ticularly upon the relationship between the federal government and the
separate states."24 The point is that those amendments, most of all the
Fourteenth, were expressly intended to change the state-federal relation-
ship, to make this a more unified country, and to give the federal govern-
ment-including the courts-more authority in what had been areas of
exclusive state jurisdiction. Justice Stevens, in short, was recalling the
pregnant fact that our bloodiest war and its aftermath profoundly and
permanently changed political relationships in the United States. The
Justice added drily that Mr. Meese had also failed to mention "the fact
that no Justice who has sat on the Supreme Court during the past sixty
years has questioned the proposition" that the Fourteenth Amendment
applies the guarantees of the First Amendment to state action.25
If Mr. Meese was serious, I said a moment ago. There is reason to
wonder. For when the consequences of undoing federal constitutional
protection against state repression were pointed out, a spokesman said
the Attorney General thought "some" of the Bill of Rights should apply
to the states.26 What, then, was Mr. Meese doing in that speech? Was he
just casually advancing a radical doctrine without understanding what it
would actually do? Or did he candidly tell us what he wishes would hap-
pen to American freedom, and then execute a politic withdrawal?
Since then Mr. Meese has dropped that idea from his speeches. But
he has not given up another point of his Bar Association talk, which he
has made the theme of a continued campaign. That theme is that judges,
in expounding the Constitution, should adopt what he called "a Jurispru-
dence of Original Intention." 27
By that the Attorney General meant that courts-and he addressed
his message especially to the Supreme Court-should follow the intent
of those who wrote the provision of the Constitution at issue in any pres-
ent case. "Those who framed the Constitution," he said, "chose their
words carefully .... The language they chose meant something. It is
incumbent upon the [Supreme] Court to determine what that meaning
24. Stevens, Address to the Federal Bar Association (Oct. 23, 1985), at 9 (text available
from the United States Supreme Court Press Office).
25. Id. Among the Justices accepting the application of first amendment quarantees to
the states through the Fourteenth Amendment has been one praised by Attorney General
Meese: Justice (now Chief Justice) Rehnquist. See Fitzpatrick v. Bitzer, 427 U.S. 445, 453-55
(1976).
26. See Taylor, Meese and His Candor, N.Y. Times, Aug. 3, 1985, at 7. col. 3.
27. Meese Address, supra note 7, at 15.
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was." 28
Let me interrupt myself here for a moment of what may be light
relief. Some years ago the Supreme Court was hearing argument in a
case involving the Twenty-first Amendment to the Constitution.29 That
was the Amendment that repealed Prohibition but at the same time gave
the states power to control the transportation or importation of alcoholic
beverages within their borders. In this case, the State of New York was
trying to control sales of duty-free liquor to departing international air-
line passengers. As the lawyers argued over what the Framers of the
Amendment had meant about state power, an amazed look came over
the face of Justice Hugo L. Black.30 He had just realized that he was a
Senator when Congress proposed the Twenty-first Amendment. He was
a Framer! It was a wonderful moment for a man who wrote with such
passion of what Jefferson meant by "an establishment of religion" and
Madison by "no law ... abridging the freedom of speech."31 But not
even the presence of a Framer on the Court left the issue of the Framers'
intentions free of doubt. The Supreme Court held that New York could
not control those duty-free liquor sales 32-Justice Black dissenting.33
Of course there is a serious point in that story. The "intent" of the
Framers is seldom easy to discover, least of all in a form useful to the
judges who must decide concrete contemporary disputes. Ninety-six
Senators who vote on a proposed constitutional amendment-that is how
many there were in Hugo Black's Senatorial days-may have ninety-six
different ideas of what they intend. Even the most particularized legisla-
tion often contains deliberately ambiguous language, so that enough
members with conflicting ideas will vote for it. They leave it to the
judges to decide what they meant. If that is true of a tax bill, how much
more inevitably is it so of a constitutional provision.
The Framers of our Constitution are known to have had individual
beliefs, strongly-held and conflicting, on the nature of government and
society. Their genius, and it surely was that, lay in part in their diversity.
They created this country by managing to submerge their differences.
But not even Madison's notes on their debates can possibly assure us of
their collective intent in the spare language they used. More important,
they did not have any measurable intention on many of the issues that
28. Id. at 16.
29. Hostetter v. Idlewild Bon Voyage Liquor Corp., 377 U.S. 324 (1964).
30. Justice Black's reaction was observed, and described to the author, by Professor Vin-
cent Blasi of the Columbia Law School.
31. U.S. CONsT. amend. I.
32. Hostetter, 377 U.S. at 334.
33. Id. (Black, J., dissenting).
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come before judges today, because they could not have imagined today's
circumstances.
The usual thing said in this regard is that men of the eighteenth
century could not have imagined airplanes or telephones or other techno-
logical changes. Thus the judges who in this century had to decide
whether wiretapping was a search and seizure condemned by the Fourth
Amendment3" could not solve the problem by looking up what the Fram-
ers thought of wiretapping. But technological change is not the real is-
sue, for a reason well stated by a judge who is often cited as an exemplary
conservative, Judge Robert Bork of the United States Court of Appeals
for the District of Columbia. What matters is the values underlying the
clauses of the Constitution, he said. He put it that the judge's job is "to
discern how the framers' values, defined in the context of the world they
knew, apply to the world we know."35 In those terms the wiretapping
question is answerable. A central value of the Fourth Amendment is
personal privacy. Its framers did not foresee electronic surveillance, but
their value should be applied today when the state uses electronic means
to invade personal privacy.
But that more sophisticated way of looking at original intention,
Judge Bork's way, is still not enough to solve many modern problems of
constitutional interpretation. Think about the Supreme Court decision
that was probably this century's most striking example of a change in
interpretation: Brown v. Board of Education.36 Attorney General Meese
says the Court was right in 1954 to change its mind and hold racial segre-
gation in public schools unconstitutional.37 Moreover, he says, the
Brown decision was consistent with his demand that courts obey the
original intention of constitutional provisions.3" How can that be? It is
because, he says, in the case of Plessy v. Ferguson39 in 1896 the Court,
holding that segregated railroad cars met the Fourteenth Amendment's
demand for the equal protection of the laws, had "disregarded the clear
intent of the Framers of the civil war amendments to eliminate the legal
degradation of blacks."'  So Brown restored the original principle of the
Fourteenth Amendment. But at the time the Amendment was adopted,
in 1868, schools were segregated-in the District of Columbia among
34. See Olmstead v. United States, 277 U.S. 438 (1928).
35. Ollman v. Evans, 750 F.2d 970, 995 (D.C. Cir. 1984) (Bork, J., concurring).
36. 347 U.S. 483 (1954).
37. Meese, Address to the District of Columbia Chapter of the Federalist Society Lawyers
Division (Nov. 15, 1985) (text available from the Department of Justice).
38. Id. at 6.
39. 163 U.S. 537 (1896).
40. Meese, supra note 37, at 6.
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other places, both South and North. The gallery of the Senate that pro-
posed the Amendment was segregated. It took some straining for the
Court to find, in the Brown opinion, that evidence of the Framers' intent
on segregated schools was "inconclusive." 41 No Justice of whom I am
aware believed or believes that the Meese canon, reliance solely on his-
tory, could have brought the Court to its decision in Brown v. Board of
Education.
What produced the great change of constitutional interpretation in
1954 was change in circumstances; in the reality of race in the human
condition; in our perception of race. In 1896, when it allowed segrega-
tion, the Supreme Court said that separation of human beings on account
of their race was a stamp of inferiority only if the segregated race chose
"to put that construction upon it."'42 The Court cited no history, no pre-
cedent, to support that proposition; the Justices simply asserted it, I sup-
pose, as a received sociological truth of the day. But after Hitler, after
the marking of Jews with yellow stars had been followed by the Holo-
caust, it would have been very hard for the Supreme Court to say that
racial segregation was invidious only if those marked out put that con-
struction upon it. Segregation was an assertion of racial inferiority. The
world knew it, and judges could not hide from that contemporary knowl-
edge in construing the old words of the Constitution.
The Brown case illustrates what a very conservative Justice of the
Supreme Court, Joseph McKenna, said in 1910 about construing the
Constitution. "Time works changes," he said, and "brings into existence
new conditions and purposes .... In the application of a Constitution,
therefore, our contemplation cannot be only of what has been but of
what may be."43
Supreme Court Justices have said a good deal over the years about
how to construe the Constitution, and their words do not offer much
comfort to the Meese canon. Chief Justice Hughes said in an opinion of
the Court:
If by the statement that what the Constitution meant at the time of
its adoption it means to-day, it is intended to say that the great
clauses of the Constitution must be confined to the interpretation
which the framers, with the condition and outlook of their time,
would have placed upon them, the statement carries its own
refutation.'
But the most eloquent, as always, was Justice Holmes:
41. Brown, 347 U.S. at 489.
42. Plessy, 163 U.S. at 551.
43. Weems v. United States, 217 U.S. 349, 373 (1910).
44. Home Bldg. & Loan Ass'n v. Blaisdell, 290 U.S. 398, 442-43 (1934).
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[W]hen we are dealing with words that also are a constituent act,
like the Constitution of the United States, we must realize that they
have called into life a being the development of which could not
have been foreseen completely by the most gifted of its beget-
ters.... The case before us must be considered in the light of our
whole experience and not merely in that of what was said a hun-
dred years ago.45
In the controversy stirred by Attorney General Meese's campaign
for "a jurisprudence of original intention," time has not won him many
supporters. Even a leading conservative intellectual, Dinesh D'Souza,
managing editor of the Heritage Foundation's Policy Review, has rejected
the Meese canon.46 He proposes an even simpler approach for judges:
just look at the text of the Constitution itself.
"The vast majority of clauses should give no anguish at all to judges
interested in what the Constitution actually says," Mr. D'Souza wrote.
"It is only a handful of clauses, such as 'due process,' 'unreasonable
search and seizure,' 'equal protection' and the like that are subjective and
open to judicial discretion."'47 What an easy life judges would have if
their job were as Mr. D'Souza imagines it to be. But alas, most of the
constitutional cases they must decide turn on what he calls subjective
clauses, and not only the clauses he mentions. Consider one of the most
familiar parts of the original Constitution, the Commerce Clause: "Con-
gress shall have Power... [t]o regulate Commerce with foreign Nations,
and among the several States, and with the Indian Tribes."48 Now there
is a nice simple declarative sentence for you. But "from the very begin-
ning of our history as a nation it was seen-as it had to be seen-in a
more complicated way. The clause is framed in affirmative terms: a
grant of power to Congress. But what about the negative? Suppose indi-
vidual states began imposing barriers on their borders, putting tariffs on
interstate commerce or giving monopolies to this company and that com-
pany to carry goods on rivers and highways?49 In Mr. D'Souza's view, I
suppose, judges could not read the Constitution to keep the states from
doing such things, because the literal text of the Commerce Clause did
not prohibit state interruptions of commerce. If John Marshall and his
colleagues had read the Constitution that way, we would not have a na-
tional economy today; Holmes doubted that we would have a nation. °
45. Missouri v. Holland, 252 U.S. 416, 433 (1920).
46. D'Souza, Meese Misreads Constitution, Boston Globe, Sept. 14, 1986, at A17. col. 3.
47. Id.
48. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, el. 3.
49. See Gibbons v. Ogden, 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) I (1824).
50. 0. W. Hot.MI's, supra note 3, at 172.
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The United States survived and prospered because Marshall did not fol-
low the canon of textual literalism in interpreting the Constitution.
Or consider the well-trod ground of the First Amendment. "Con-
gress," it says, "shall make no law . . . abridging the freedom of
speech." 51 Another straightforward command. Justice Black always
said it should be taken just that way: literally. "No law means no
law."52 But when Justice Black did not like a particular utterance or its
circumstances, he found ways to avoid his own simplicity. Shocking
words were not really "speech." 3 Speech near courthouses,5 4 or by chil-
dren in school,55 was different. And so on.
For most other judges, and for the rest of us who grapple with the
First Amendment, those few words pose excruciating intellectual and
philosophical problems-and looking for the Framers' intentions throws
very little light on them. After the First Amendment's adoption, the
common law of libel continued to be applied. But then, in 1962, an Ala-
bama jury gave record libel damages to a white politician who sued over
an advertisement in the New York Times-a message advertisement
against segregation-that did not name him but that he said inferentially
reflected on him.5 6 The judgment threatened to let loose an avalanche of
libel suits that would keep the national press out of the South at a crucial
time in the struggle over segregation. No libel judgment had ever before
been set aside as a violation of the First Amendment. Should that his-
tory have been conclusive? Or was the Supreme Court right to decide
that this libel action threatened to suppress a right at the core of the First
Amendment, 7 the citizens' right to speak freely, in Madison's phrase,
about "public characters and measures?" 58 I think we would be in a
different country, a far less free country, if the Supreme Court had wood-
enly followed precedent and found that libel judgment unaffected by the
First Amendment.
51. U.S. CONST. amend. I.
52. See, e.g., Dennis v. United States, 341 U.S. 494, 579 (1951) (Black, J., dissenting).
53. Cohen v. California, 403 U.S. 15, 27 (1971) (Blackmun, J., dissenting, in which Black,
J., joins) (shocking words on jacket not "speech").
54. See, e.g., Cox v. Louisiana, 379 U.S. 559, 578 (1965) (Black, J., dissenting) (court-
house picketing not protected because the First Amendment prohibits governmental restric-
tions on speech and assembly only "where people have a right to be for such purposes"
(emphasis in original)).
55. Tinker v. Des Moines School Dist., 393 U.S. 503, 515 (1969) (Black, J., dissenting)
(symbolic speech by students not "speech").
56. New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 273 Ala. 656, 144 S.2d 25 (P)62), rev'd, 376 U.S.
254 (1964).
57. New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254 (1964).
58. See id. at 274 (quoting 4 E.io'rs DEBATIS ON rn"t: FF.DE RAI. CONSTITUION 553-54
(1876)).
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If the doctrine of original intent has as little support as I suggest,
you may wonder why I have dwelt on it-why I have taken so much of
your time discussing Attorney General Meese's campaign on that theme.
After all, there is always room for debate about how judges should ap-
proach the duty of enforcing the Constitution. It is a curiosity that
judges should have such a role in a democracy, that they should be able
to say no to elected politicians. To reflect on that feature of our system is
never wrong, and certainly not for an Attorney General to do so.
But this is more than reflection. It is a campaign, and I think it has
worrying overtones. It rings of an effort to intimidate judges into taking
a narrower view of their function. Just incidentally, that view would be
more congenial to the current National Administration's legal agenda:
preventive detention, for example, capital punishment, and elimination of
the rule excluding illegally seized matter from evidence in criminal
trials.59
And it is not just a campaign of lofty abstractions. This Administra-
tion is going to appoint more federal judges than any of its predeces-
sors, 60 and the Justice Department is scrutinizing prospective appointees
with fanatical care to see that they will carry out the desired ideological
agenda.61 A Republican conservative has lately told us that he was ex-
cluded from consideration for a judgeship because, among other things,
he belonged to that establishment organization, the Lawyers' Committee
for Civil Rights Under Law.62 And then there was the recent speech by
Mr. Meese's Assistant Attorney General for Civil Rights, William Brad-
ford Reynolds. It was no subtle intimidation; it was an aggressive attack,
by name, on the senior member of the Supreme Court, Justice Brennan.
The Justice's views, Mr. Reynolds said, constitute a major threat-"per-
haps the major threat to individual liberty" under our Constitution. 63 To
prove that point, he invented quotations and attributed them to Justice
Brennan: for example, the statement that the Constitution is essentially a
"dead letter"-which of course the Justice had not said.64
It is no great secret why Justice Brennan should be a target. He has
played a crucial part on the Court in enforcing congressional statutes
and voluntary local arrangements to bring blacks into the mainstream of
59. Interview with Attorney General Meese , A.B.A. J., July 1985, at 44-46.
60. Browning, Reagan Molds the Federal Court in His Own Image, A.B.A. J., Aug. 1985,
at 60.
61. See Lacovara, The Wrong Way to Pick Judges, N.Y. Times, Oct. 3, 1986, at A31, col.
I.
62. Id.
63. Reynolds, supra note 8, at 4.
64. Id.
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our economic life after generations of discrimination.6" And Mr. Reyn-
olds has bitterly opposed that effort. More broadly, for thirty years Jus-
tice Brennan has been a leading judicial voice in protecting freedom of
speech and press, assuring that the votes we cast are counted equally and
resisting the power of the state-the power of the federal government-
to control our lives in the name of national security.66 Power is the issue.
The government wants more, and wants to exercise it without con-
straints. Justice Brennan is an obstacle to that aim. That is why he was
made a target. And that is why it matters.
All Presidents object to limitations on their power. Ronald Reagan
is no different from Lyndon Johnson in that regard. Attorneys General
argue again and again in lawsuits that this act of Congress or that judicial
decision infringes on the prerogatives of the President. But I know of no
time when the momentum of those arguments was so strong, when the
courts were so deferential to them, when a President exercised such
enormous power without realistic constraints.
When the courts were so deferential: I emphasize that point. It is a
reason for the deepest concern. We live in an age when Presidents have
an enormous military and intelligence apparatus, none of which existed
when I was growing up. There was no huge standing army then, no
Central Intelligence Agency, no vast National Security Agency listening
in on conversations all over the world with its eavesdropping devices.
And no nuclear weapons. It is a different world today. And from the
nature of that world has come the development in our country of a na-
tional security state, with some of the constitutional presumptions of our
past turned upside down. That is a strong statement. Let me test it with
a little recent history.
In 1952 we were in a painful war in Korea. The United Steelwork-
ers Union called a strike that threatened to cripple the war effort. Presi-
dent Truman headed off the strike by seizing the nation's steel mills and
operating them under nominal control of the government. The compa-
nies sued, challenging the President's power to take their property. 67 In
the trial court the Justice Department lawyer, Holmes Baldridge, argued
65. See Local 93, Int'l Ass'n of Firefighters v. City of Cleveland, 106 S. Ct. 3063 (1986);
see also Regents of the Univ. of Cal. v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265, 324 (1978) (Brennan, J., concur-
ring and dissenting).
66. See, e.g., New York Times Co. v. United States, 403 U.S. 713, 724 (1971) (Brennan,
J., concurring) (disallowing government's prior restraint on publication of the Pentagon Pa-
pers); New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 255 (1964); Baker v. Carr. 369 U.S. 196
(1962) (holding that the political question doctrine does not preclude judicial review of a gerry-
mandering allegation).
67. Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579 (1952) [hereinafter the Steel
Seizure Case].
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that the President could act as he had, without a statute authorizing
seizure, because he had inherent power to act for the national safety.
The trial judge questioned Mr. Baldridge, and these exchanges occurred:
The Court: So you contend the Executive has unlimited
power in the time of an emergency?
Mr. Baldridge: He has the power to take such action as is
necessary to meet the emergency.
[T]he distinction that the Constitution itself makes between
the powers of the Executive and the powers of the legislative
branch ... are significant ....
In so far as the Executive is concerned, all executive power is
vested in the President. In so far as legislative powers are con-
cerned, the Congress has only those powers that are specifically
delegated to it ....
The Court: So, when the sovereign people adopted the Con-
stitution, it... limited the powers of the Congress and limited the
powers of the judiciary, but it did not limit the powers of the
Executive.
Is that what you say?
Mr. Baldridge: That is the way we read Article II ....
The Supreme Court rejected the government's argument in the Steel
Seizure Case.69 It held that the President could not act-not even in a
wartime emergency-in the absence of authority given by legislation or
inferable from the action or acquiescence of Congress.7" The steel mills
were returned to the companies.
The Steel Seizure Case was a landmark decision in the field of sepa-
ration of powers: a reaffirmation of the Framers' belief that our freedom
could best be maintained by distributing power among three branches of
government and preventing concentration of power in any one of them.
The lesson of the Steel Seizure Case was applied in 1971, when President
Nixon asked the courts to stop publication of the Pentagon Papers in the
New York Times.71 The Supreme Court said "no" to the President, in
part because of first amendment considerations, and in part because Con-
gress had passed no law authorizing injunctions against publications that
a President said were a threat to national security.7 2
68. A. WESTIN, THE ANATOMY OF A CONSTITUTIONAL LAW SUIT: YOUNGSTOWN
SHEET AND TUBE CO. V. SAWYER; THE STEEL SEIZURE DECISION 62-64 (1958).
69. 343 U.S. at 585.
70. Id. See also id. at 635-38 (Jackson, J., concurring).
71. New York Times Co. v. United States, 403 U.S. 713 (1971).
72. Id. at 744-46 (Marshall, J., concurring).
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But all that-sounds long ago and far away as I describe it. For one
looks in vain through more recent decisions of the Supreme Court for
any indication that a President must have some authority in law before
he can take action against Americans for what he asserts are reasons of
national security.
In 1980 the Supreme Court considered the case of a former C.I.A.
official, Frank Snepp, who was deeply disturbed about the way he
thought we had abandoned our allies in Vietnam---even leaving the
names of our Vietnamese intelligence sources in files, so they would
surely face retribution.73 Mr. Snepp published a book about the last days
in Vietnam7 4 without first showing the manuscript to the agency, as he
had promised to do. The former Director of Central Intelligence, Wil-
liam Colby, had complained to Congress that there was no remedy when
former employees of the C.I.A. published material without first clearing
it; he asked Congress for legislation, but none was passed.75 The
Supreme Court stepped into the breach by simply making up law to pun-
ish Mr. Snepp. It imposed on him what it called a constructive trust,
namely the seizure of all he had earned or would earn from the book-
about $175,000 so far, more than the maximum fine for many heinous
federal crimes. And it enjoined him, for the rest of his life, from speaking
or writing anything related to intelligence, even fiction, without first get-
ting clearance from the C.I.A.: the first time in American history that
the Supreme Court had put a prior restraint on speech about governmen-
tal matters. The Court did all that without letting Mr. Snepp's lawyers
brief or argue the case. It did so although the government conceded for
purposes of the case that his book contained no classified material. And
it did so, I repeat, although Congress had been asked to create a remedy
in such situations and had not enacted legislation.
The uninhibited lawmaking by the Court in the Snepp case en-
couraged President Reagan to try an even bolder step on his own. In
1983 he issued a National Security Decision Directive requiring more
than 120,000 government officials with access to highly classified infor-
mation to sign contracts that would require them to clear any writings on
the general subject of their work with censors-for the rest of their lives,
whether in or out of government service.76 Once again there was no basis
in any statute for such a program. And it is easy to understand why the
73. Snepp v. United States, 444 U.S. 507 (1980).
74. F. SNEPP, DECENT INTERVAL (1977).
75. See Petition for Certiorari, at 26-27, in Knopf v. Colby, No. 74-1164, cert. denied, 421
U.S. 992, reh'g denied, 422 U.S. 1049 (1975).
76. National Security Decision Directive, Mar. 11, 1983 (text on file at the Hastings Con-
stitutional Law Quarterly offices).
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Administration attempted to act without going to Congress for legisla-
tion. Legislating takes time. Congress rarely does exactly what the Pres-
ident wants. In this case it was a certainty, I think, that Congress would
not impose so drastic and permanent a censorship system on men and
women who came to work for the government, however briefly. But that
is the very reason-the reason in the mind of those who wrote the Con-
stitution-why Presidents should not be able to act on their own. The
constitutional theory is that debate and reflection produce better policies
than those imposed by flat. Congress in fact rebelled against President
Reagan's National Security Decision Directive, forcing him to suspend
it-for a time, in any event.7 7 But there has been no change in the
Supreme Court's evident willingness to accept as law whatever the Presi-
dent does under the banner of national security.
In 1981, the Court held that the government could revoke the pass-
port of a citizen whose travel abroad assertedly injured national secur-
ity,7 8 although earlier Supreme Court decisions had limited executive
power to deny passports for political reasons,7 9 and Congress had not
responded to presidential requests for corrective legislation." In 1984,
the Court sustained a Treasury regulation that prevented most Ameri-
cans from traveling to Cuba,81 although again the legislative authority
for such a step was dubious.
In those cases the Supreme Court emphasized the great power of the
President in matters of defense and foreign affairs, and its own reluctance
to touch those areas. The opinion in the passport case said that "matters
intimately related to foreign policy and national security are rarely
proper subjects for judicial intervention."8 2 In other words, the Presi-
dent is presumed to have plenary power. But that is to forget the fear of
power that moved the Framers: the presumption against concentrated
power that was reaffirmed in the Steel Seizure Case.
77. Senate Bars Lifetime Censorship, Washington Post, Oct. 21, 1983, at 1, col. 1.
Despite the suspension of the directive, more than 290,000 present and former federal
employees signed a form promising to submit material for clearance before publication for the
rest of their lives. In 1985, under that continuing program, 14,144 books, articles, and
speeches were submitted to censors for clearance. See Engelberg, Security Rule Died but Lived
On, N.Y. Times, Oct. 23, 1986, at 12, col. 4.
78. Haig v. Agee, 453 U.S. 280 (1981).
79. See, e.g., Aptheker v. Secretary of State, 378 U.S. 500 (1964); Kent v. Dulles, 357 U.S.
116 (1958).
80. See Haig v. Agee, 453 U.S. at 317 n.7 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
81. Regan v. Wald, 468 U.S. 222 (1984).
82. Haig v. Agee, 453 U.S. at 292. See also Edgar & Schmidt, Curtiss-Wright Comes
Home: Executive Powers and National Security Secrecy, 21 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 349
(1986).
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Unbridled presidential power is not a matter of marginal or esoteric
concern. We know from recent history-repeated history- that Presi-
dents can slide this country into self-destructive wars. Earlier this year,
when President Reagan was having trouble persuading Congress to vote
for military aid to the Contras in Nicaragua, an editorial writer for the
Wall Street Journal wrote that the President should not be detained by
defeat in Congress: he should just "unilaterally order a transfer of funds
to the Contras."83 So much for the Constitution and the separation of
powers. That is modern-day conservatism. I remember when it was a
conservative axiom to oppose concentrated power in this country. Con-
servatives cheered the Steel Seizure Case,84 in which Justice Jackson
wrote of the idea of elastic presidential power in time of claimed emer-
gency: "The Constitution did not contemplate that the title Commander
in Chief of the Army and Navy will constitute him also Commander in
Chief of the country."85
Attorney General Meese praises the separation of powers, but his is
a one-way version of the doctrine: it strikes down the slightest gesture by
Congress that strays from its customary bounds, but it rejects all chal-
lenge to new exercises of power by the President.
Thus the Attorney General praised the Supreme Court's decision on
the Gramm-Rudman-Hollings budget law.86 The Court held the act un-
constitutional because it called on the Comptroller General to perform
some of the calculations in the scheme of automatic spending cuts.87
That was an "executive" function, the Court said, but the Comptroller
was a "legislative" creature because he could be removed at Congress'
initiative. But the Comptroller can be removed only by a joint resolu-
tion, signed by the President or passed by a two-thirds vote of both
houses over his veto.88 And besides, no one has ever tried to remove a
Comptroller General in the sixty-five years the office has existed. So the
objection was not only trivial but theoretical. Of Congress we demand
empty punctilio. On Presidents we set no limits when they assert the
needs of national security. Not in fourteen years has the Supreme Court
found a presidential action invalid for want of legislative authority. 89
83. Crovitz, Plenty of Precedents for Bypassing Congress on Contra Aid, Wall St. J., Mar.
25, 1986, at 30, col. 3.
84. 343 U.S. 579 (1952).
85. Id. at 643-44 (Jackson, J., concurring) (emphasis in original).
86. Bowsher v. Synar, 106 S. Ct. 3181 (1986).
87. Id at 3192.
88. Id. at 3198 & n.7. See also id. at 3210 (White, J., dissenting).
89. See Edgar & Schmidt, supra note 82, at 365 n.45.
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There is a further irony in those recent cases. Conservatives, includ-
ing the Attorney General, say they are against "judicial activism" and for
"restraint." But there could hardly be a more "activist" performance
than what the Supreme Court did in the Gramm-Rudman case: it
reached out to find a tiny theoretical flaw in order to strike down an
important statute.
In the period when Earl Warren was Chief Justice, the Supreme
Court often employed a much more restrained approach when dealing
with sensitive legislation. It insisted on finding clear authority in legisla-
tion for rules that touched on significant civil liberties concerns.90 For
example, an industrial employee who had lost his security clearance after
charges by unnamed informers challenged the procedure as unconstitu-
tional. The Supreme Court, without reaching the constitutional issue,
held that neither Congress nor the President had clearly authorized a
security program denying an opportunity for confrontation of accusers. 91
In effect the Court remitted the issue to Congress, saying: "If you really
want to do this, you will have to say so without equivocation." It was a
form of deference to the legislative branch not much in evidence in the
Supreme Court these days.
The most worrying of all the contemporary cases is going through
the courts right now, and I must say a word about it before I conclude.
This country has never had a general law making it a crime to disclose
classified information. In fact, as you know, classified material is leaked
every day in the bureaucratic wars of Washington. Our laws make it a
crime to disclose secrets only of particularly dangerous kinds: nuclear
secrets, for example.92 And there are espionage acts against transmission
of defense information to foreign powers.9" That is all-or so we
thought.
Now a Navy employee, Samuel Loring Morison, has been convicted
under the Espionage Act:94 not because he slipped information to a So-
viet agent, like so many other Defense Department employees we have
heard about in the last year.95 Rather, because he gave a magazine clas-
90. See P. FREUND, THE SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES 178-80 (1961).
91. Greene v. McElroy, 360 U.S. 474 (1959).
92. See, e.g., 42 U.S.C. § 2274 (1983).
93. See, e.g., 18 U.S.C. §§ 793-794 (1983).
94. See Damming a Leak. Photo Filcher Found Guilty, TIME, Oct. 28, 1985, at 45; see also
United States v. Morison, 604 F. Supp. 655 (D. Md.), appeal dismissed, 774 F.2d 1156 (4th
Cir. 1985) (denying summary judgment on first amendment grounds); 622 F. Supp. 1990 (D
Md. 1985) (supressing evidence of Morison's patriotism).
95. See, e.g., Wise, The Spy Who Got Away, N.Y. Times, Nov. 2, 1986, § 6 (Magazine), at
18 (discussing Edwin Lee Howard); Kittle, Spies in the U.S.-A Growing Infestation, U.S.
NEWS & WORLD REP., June 10, 1985, at 42 (discussing John Walker, Jr.); 150-year Prison
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sified material for publication. He did so because he thought the Ameri-
can public did not appreciate the growing Soviet aircraft naval threat,
and he thought this item-a satellite photograph of a Soviet aircraft car-
rier under construction-would alert the public.96 The Espionage Act
has been on the books since 1917, and no one has ever before been con-
victed under it for supplying material to a publication. Moreover, Con-
gress has repeatedly rejected presidential requests for laws making it a
crime to publish classified information.97
Attorney General Meese, in his Bar Association speech, said it
would be his policy "to resurrect the original meaning of constitutional
provisions and statutes. . . . Any other standard suffers the defect of
pouring new meaning into old words .... ,98 There could hardly be a
better description of what he and his colleagues have persuaded a trial
judge to do in the Morison case: to pour new meaning into the old words
of the Espionage Act. And again the reason is plain. As long as judges
are pliant, it is easier to go to them for repressive new powers than to
Congress, which has so often denied the very powers sought. Yes, there
is an inconsistency in the Attorney General's speeches and his actions,
but that is not unusual. His interest is not in theory but in power.
Ten years ago, in this room, I had the privilege of speaking about
the two-hundredth anniversary of the Declaration of Independence. 99 I
said then that it was really the Constitution that had made us a nation
and kept us free all this time. My faith in the Constitution is the same as
we approach its bicentennial. Its system of divided powers remains the
best way-the way proved by our American experience-to avoid
tyranny.
But the system depends to a very large degree on judicial enforce-
ment. Asking the holders of power to set their own boundaries on its use
is not a very practical form of limitation, as other peoples have learned.
Indeed, other countries in growing numbers are adopting, or at least talk-
ing about, the uniquely American idea of judicially enforceable bills of
rights. Canada has a new bill of rights, being actively expounded by its
courts. France, which might have been thought the last country to let
judges into political matters, has a constitutional court. Discussion of a
Term Sought For Convicted Spy, N.Y. Times, Aug. 26, 1986, at A10, col. 6 (discussing Jerry A.
Whitworth).
96. Morison, 604 1. Supp. at 658.
97. See Edgar & Schmidt, supra note 82, at 373 n.72; see also Nimmer, National Security
Secrets v. Free Speech: The Issues Left Undecided in the Ellsberg case, 26 STAN. L. REV. 311,
313 n.15 (1974).
98. Meese Address, supra note 7, at 17-18 (emphasis added).
99. Lewis, A Constitutional Faith, 3 HASTINGS CONsT. L.Q. 679 (1976).
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possible bill of rights is one pale glimmer in the dark night of South
Africa.
I see no reason for us to fall back in our commitment to constitu-
tionalism; to act as if those niceties had to be sacrificed in a dangerous
world. And I see no reason, especially, for us to say that our judges
should take a narrower view of their function- should be more timid in
speaking truth to power. The opposite is true, for reasons stated more
than twenty years ago by a brilliant federal judge, Charles E. Wyzanski,
Jr.:
There has been a prodigious increase in both executive and legisla-
tive powers. Today the President has a dominant role in the initia-
tion of both domestic and foreign policy. The power of the
military establishment, now so clearly intertwined with scientific,
technological and production processes, is unprecedented.... Con-
gress... is master of the whole economic life of the nation, includ-
ing finance, transport, trade, business, labor, agriculture and social
security. It is against these developments that we should consider
the power of the Supreme Court.... How small, relatively speak-
ing, is that power.... To reduce [it] would be greatly to increase
the possibilities of executive, legislative or military tyranny.' °
Twenty years later the tendency toward concentrated power has not
lessened. Presidents have gathered more power unto themselves, and
they have acquired the habit of asserting it unilaterally. Congress has
become more compliant with the wishes of the Executive. Yet we are
told, in strident voices, that judges must be more deferential: that de-
mocracy requires them to get out of the way.
In abstract logic it may be undemocratic for judges to say no to
political power. But the life of our Constitution has not been logic: it
has been experience. And our experience is that we depend on judges for
our freedom: on their courage and wisdom, on our understanding that
there are no easy answers to their hard problems.
For all those reasons I think it is a fitting time, an urgent time, to
honor the memory of Mathew Tobriner.
100. Wyzanski, Introduction to L. HAND, BILL OF RIGHTS at xii-xiii (paper ed. 1964).
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